The marginalization of Africa in world trade: by Bora, Saswati et al.
In debates about globalization, Africa’s ability to take 
advantage of trading opportunities has always been under 
contention. Data indicate that the continent’s share of world 
exports has declined sharply, from about 5.5 percent in 1975 
to about 2.5 percent in 2002 (Figure 1). At face value, this 
declining share points to the increased marginalization of 
Africa in world trade, but the observed pattern of trade need 
not be inconsistent with predicted trade, which is dependent 
on income levels and trading costs between countries, among 
other factors. Evidence from existing literature on the trading 
status of Africa is mixed, based on varying timeframes, method-
ologies, and regions of focus (for example, comparisons among 
developing countries or between industrialized and developing 
countries). 
Researchers like Sachs and Warner (1997) assert that 
Africa has been left out of the process of globalization, while 
the World Bank (2000) states that losses in world trade have 
cost Africa almost US$70 billion a year, reflecting lack of 
product diversification and shrinking market shares for tradi-
tional goods. Subramanian and Tamirisa (2001) also find 
evidence for the marginalization of Africa in world exports. 
Separating the continent into two distinct regions, they find 
that Central and West Africa has exhibited increasingly low 
trade performance over time, whereas East and Southern Africa 
has shown average performance with indications that it also 
may not be keeping pace with global integration.
In contrast to the studies cited above, a number of other 
studies argue that Africa’s trade flows have been consistent with 
predicted trade, meaning that the continent has successfully 
utilized trading opportunities based on changes in the factors 
that determine trade levels. A pioneering study by Foroutan 
and Pritchett (1993) argues that there is no evidence to suggest 
that trade flows within Sub-Saharan Africa were differentially 
low, either as a result of poor policy choices or weak infra-
structure. The authors observe that trade flows tallied with 
predicted trade levels and that low levels of trade could be 
explained by low levels of gross domestic product (GDP). 
According to Rodrik (1998), Africa participates in 
international trade as much as can be expected according to 
international benchmarks for trade volume derived from a 
country’s income level, size, and geographic location. Coe 
and Hoffmaister (1998) support Rodrik’s results, estimating a 
gravity model of bilateral trade between developing and indus-
trialized countries. Their results indicate that in the early 1990s 
the trade performance of Africa was in fact normal compared 
with developing countries in other regions.  
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n recent years, trade in Africa has assumed greater importance as a means of alleviat-
ing poverty, especially since the initiation of the Doha Round for development. At the 
same time, skepticism regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid has grown (Easterly 2006). 
Trade and aid have often been viewed as interchangeable, but “aid for trade” has recently 
gained prominence, with the result that the two factors are more often treated as comple-
mentary. Proponents of “aid for trade” argue that the capacity of developing countries 
to take advantage of any gains in market access through the Doha Round is hampered 
by a plethora of supply-side bottlenecks and costs, administrative constraints, and poor 
institutions. Aid for trade, thus, refers to additional aid to tackle trade-related constraints 
and adjustment costs in developing countries (Evenett 2005).1 Views differ as to what this 
package should entail, but many developing countries are in favor of building supply-




1 Aid for trade was officially put on the World Trade Organization (WTO) agenda at the 6th Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in December 2005, and the proposal 
that WTO governments develop an aid for trade package arose in the context of Doha Round negotiations.
Research Brief No. 7These authors do, however, point to a declining trend in 
the performance of North–South trade in Africa over the 
past 25 years, which markedly contrasts with the increasing 
trend in Latin America and the broadly stable pattern in 
Asia. Subramanian and Tamirisa (2001) note that Coe and 
Hoffmaister (1998) do not control for a key variable in their 
analysis—the preferential trading arrangement between Africa 
and the European Union under the Lomé Convention. 
Against this background, in this brief we revisit the issue 
of Africa’s trade performance using a comprehensive dataset on 
trade protection, the MAcMap database (Bouët et al. 2007). 
The highlight of the dataset is that it captures a more extensive 
set of trade protection measures and allows for country-specific 
levels of market access. We begin by evaluating the levels of 
existing market access for Africa and assess whether or not 
Africa trades less than its predicted level. Further, we quantify 
the impact of infrastructure on trade using a framework that 
allows the interaction of infrastructure variables. Importantly, 
our results show that Africa has good market access at the 
continent level, second only to Europe, but that access varies 
widely across countries within Africa. Building on this result, 
we capture country-specific market access in our empirical 
analysis, while explaining Africa’s trade performance. Notably, 
the timeframe for the analysis, 2001 and 2004, enables the 
inclusion of the effect of two large-scale preferential trade 
arrangements for Africa: the Everything but Arms Initiative 
and the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
Market Access for Africa
In the debate over trade versus aid, proponents of the ineffec-
tiveness of aid often argue that Africa’s trade prospects can be 
improved by enhanced market access, mainly via discriminatory 
preferences vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This begs the ques-
tion, how good is current market access for Africa relative to 
the rest of the world? In this section, we assess Africa’s access to 
world markets. Data on average export duties by region, coun-
try, and income group are provided in Table 1. Europe has the 
best access to foreign markets, on average, but African market 
access is in fact better than that of North and Latin America, 
Asia, and the Pacific region. There are significant variations 
within Africa, however, with 21 countries having better access 
than the world average, and 11 countries incurring export du-
ties of less than 2 percent. Thirty-two countries have market 
access below the world average, with 13 countries incurring 
average export duties of more than 10 percent and Malawi fac-
ing tariffs of 23.1 percent. 
This contrasting picture of countries across Africa with 
regard to access to foreign markets arises from two different 
effects. First, the structure of world protection is unequally 
distributed among sectors and across importers. Countries that 
are highly specialized in certain agricultural products––such as 
meat, milk, sugar, or some cereals––are penalized, as are those 
that export to protectionist countries. This is called a “compo-
sition effect.” At the same time, however, preferential access 
decreases average export duties for countries to which it is 
granted. This second effect is the “true preference margin.”  
If the composition effect is positive, even in the absence of 
preferences, a country will benefit from a lower tariff rate than 
the world average. A positive true preference margin implies 
that the country benefits from a higher preference than the 
world and vice versa.
For Africa, the true preference margin is negative  
(Table 2). Hence, on average, African exports are given lower 
preference compared with the world. Europe benefits from the 
largest true preference margin due to the European Union. 
Thus, since African countries enjoy good market access despite 
a negative true preference margin, the good market access 
results from the composition effect. The benefit to Africa 
occurs when it faces a lower average duty than the world 
does (by 0.3 percent), due to specializations in oil, gas, and 
mineral products or commodities that are not highly taxed 
throughout the world. Within Africa, exports from Benin, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Togo are penalized due to 
specializations in highly protected products, while preferences 
only partially compensate. In contrast, Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Libya each have a very strong and 
positive composition effect. This phenomenon reinforces the 
importance of accounting for country specificity in capturing 
the effect of market access for Africa.
The Impact of Free Access to Africa
With a negative true preference margin, Africa could experience 
significant growth in market access because of trade preferences, 
though the above results also show the possibility of significant 
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Figure 1—Africa’s share of world exports  
(goods and services), 1970–2002So








































2000variation across countries. Generating simula-
tions from the MIRAGE model2 using the 
MAcMap database, Berisha-Krasniqi et al. 
(2007) analyze to what degree African export 
levels could increase with improved market 
access. The three scenarios modeled involve 
the impact in 2015 of providing 55 African 
countries with free trade access (a) in the 
United States; (b) in OECD countries exclud-
ing Korea and Mexico; and (c) in OECD 
countries plus Brazil, China, and India.
Duty-free/quota-free (DFQF) access 
has no impact on exports for countries that 
already have good access (Table 3). Hence 
three African countries––Botswana, with 
good access due to trade in diamonds, 
copper, and nickel; Nigeria, an oil exporter; 
and Zambia, a copper exporter––barely 
experience any boost in exports as a 
result of DFQF access. Other countries, 
however, do experience a significant 
positive effect from DFQF access: 
exports of products like sugar (from 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, 
Tanzania and Uganda), milk and dairy 
(from Mozambique and Uganda), textiles 
(from Madagascar, Malawi, and Uganda), 
and apparel (from Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania) increase 
significantly.3 
Africa: The Role of Market  
Access and Domestic  
Factors in Marginalization
The next question is whether Africa’s trade 
flows should in fact be higher given the 
current level of market access, or whether 
they would remain below predicted levels 
even if market access were enhanced.
To answer this question, we use a 
gravity model to analyze the patterns of bilateral trade (that is, 
trade between two countries), which is formally specified in the 
model as a function of the trading costs and GDP of both the 
exporting and the importing countries.4  In principle, it is not 
only the absolute trading costs between two countries that are 
important, but also the costs of trading with the rest of world, 
so both are included in our regressions. The variable of interest 
is the dummy variable capturing Africa as the exporter. Table 
4 presents the results of the simplest Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions.5 
Globally, if infrastructure is not taken into account 
(Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4), the coefficient of the African 
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  Exports
Region/country Global Agricultural Industrial
Primary 
nonagricultural
Africa 4.2 15.2 3.9 1.6
Angola 1.5 6.4 0.9 1.5
Democratic Republic of Congo 1.2 17.3 0.7 1.1
Lesotho 1.3 9.2 1.3 2.5
Malawi 23.1 27.4 8.5 6.1
Asia 5.1 19.3 4.9 1.6
Europe 3.6 12.1 2.9 1.2
Pacific region 10.6 32.1 4.3 2.5
North and Latin America 5.3 18.5 3.7 1.2
Least-developed countries 4.7 15.3 4.3 2.0
Middle-income countries 5.1 20.0 4.6 1.5
OECD countries 4.1 14.0 3.3 1.3
World 4.5 16.0 3.7 1.5
Table 1 —Tariff protection applied to exports, 2004 (percent)
Source: Bouët et al. 2007.
Note: OECD indicates Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Table 2 —Apparent margin and its decomposition for sample African  









True preference  
margin
Africa 4.2 0.3 0.6 -0.3
Chad 1.3 3.3 4.0 -0.8
Democratic Republic of Congo 1.2 3.3 4.5 -1.2
Malawi 23.1 -18.6 -23.1 4.5
Togo 14.9 -10.4 -10.8 0.5
Asia 5.1 -0.6 0.5 -1.1
Europe 3.6 0.9 0.1 0.8
Pacific region 10.6 -6.0 -5.3 -0.7
North and Latin America 5.3 -0.8 -0.8 0.1
Least-developed countries 4.7 -0.1 -1.2 1.1
Middle-income countries 5.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.7
OECD countries 4.1 0.4 0.0 0.4
World 4.5
Source: Bouët et al. 2007.
Note: OECD indicates Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. Full description of the model is available at the CEPII 
website (www.cepii.fr).
3 Critics have raised concerns that OECD–country access to African markets will crowd out low-income non–African country exports. Our findings, however, indicate that this 
crowding out effect is very small for low-income countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan (Table 3). In the case of Zambia, DFQF access does not increase access to foreign markets 
because copper and its products constitute 70 percent of Zambian exports. Nevertheless, the model results are misleading for Zambia because the model aggregates the chemical and 
mineral sector and erroneously concludes that redistribution occurs between Zambia and other African countries.
4 Trading costs are captured by variables such as transport costs (proxied by bilateral distance) and trade barriers (such as bilateral tariffs between the two countries).
5 We apply different methodologies (Tobit regressions and Heckit estimation) to determine the robustness of results, depending on how zero trade is accounted for in the empirical 
specifications. For brevity, the results are not presented here; they are nevertheless qualitatively robust to different specifications.  dummy is significantly negative, indicating that GDP, 
geographic distance, and access to foreign markets do not fully 
explain Africa’s low trade performance. In the same sample, 
however, if trade-related infrastructure is included (that is, air 
and road transportation and communications infrastructure), 
the significance of the African dummy is removed.6 In our 
analysis, Africa’s trade performance is not low in the context 
of other low-income countries. Hence, factors associated with 
positive trade impacts in low-income countries––such as trade-
related infrastructure––come to the fore as likely explanations 
for Africa’s trade marginalization.
The Impact of Infrastructure on Trade
Having established that infrastructure is a potential factor in 
Africa’s lower than expected trade flows, we employ a semi-para-
metric specification of the gravity model that enables all possible 
interactions across types of infrastructure when estimating their 
impact on trade. We consider two infrastructure variables at a 
time: road density and cell phone density. Figure 2 presents the 
impact of small increases in cell phone density on trade flows in 
African countries in 2001 and 2004. The impact of cell phone 
density in all countries increases drastically between 2001 and 
2004. The marginal impact on trade is much higher in 2004. 
This is possibly due to network effects, implying that the same 
percentage increase in cell phone density is much more produc-
tive in 2004, given a significantly higher base number of cell 
phone users.
In a counterfactual exercise, all countries in the sample are 
set to have the same level of road density (Figure 3). The two 
data lines present the marginal impact of cell phones when all 
countries have a road density equal to the highest 50 percent of 
the sample and 90 percent of the sample, respectively. When 
the common level of road density increases, the marginal impact 
of cell phones also increases. We interpret this as evidence that 
road and cell phone infrastructure are complementary.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The results of our assessment indicate that, on average, Africa’s 
access to foreign markets is good, but significant variations oc-
cur across countries. In particular, access by some of the very 
low-income countries, like Malawi, is comparatively bad. Trade 
preferences have the potential to improve market access by low-
ering African export duties. Based on the recipients of African 
exports (by country) and the types of products exported, Africa’s 
true preference margin is currently negative. This implies that 
greater market access will benefit African exports, but the effects 
will vary by country. The evidence does indicate, however, that 
even if preferences were to enhance export levels, it is possible 
that African trade would remain below the ideal level, possibly 
due to low levels of trade-related infrastructure. This implies that 
interventions to improve both the level and quality of infrastruc-
ture could yield high returns, albeit depending on significant 
complementarities. Consequently, policy interventions that 
promote piecemeal infrastructure development are likely to yield 
much lower returns than those stemming from comprehensive 
infrastructure development strategies.
4
6 In Tobit and Heckit estimations, the significance of the African dummy is invariably reduced.
Table 3 —Projected impact of duty free/quota free access on exports from African and 







OECD and  
other countries
Bangladesh -0.3 -0.3 -0.1
Botswana 0.0 1.7 -1.0
Madagascar 9.8 15.5 44.5
Malawi 2.7 7.8 7.1
Mauritius 3.1 13.0 26.0
Mozambique 0.3 1.4 5.5
Nigeria 0.0 0.1 0.6
Pakistan -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
South Africa 0.1 3.7 15.0
Tanzania 0.1 2.0 8.5
Uganda 0.1 2.3 3.7
Zambia -0.1 -0.9 -2.6
Zimbabwe 0.3 3.6 5.8
Source: MIRAGE model projections, 2007.
Notes: United States indicates a scenario whereby the United States gives duty free/quota free (DFQF) access to 55 African 
countries; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries indicates a scenario whereby  
OECD countries, with the exception of Korea and Mexico, give DFQF access to 55 African countries; and OECD and  
other countries indicates a scenario whereby OECD countries, together with Brazil, China, and India, give DFQF access  
to 55 African countries.5
Table 4 —Gravity model results for Africa’s export status, with and without controlling 
for infrastructure, 2001 and 2004
2001 2004
Log linear specification,  
2001 (variable)
No accounting for 
infrastructure 
(1)
Accounting for  
infrastructure 
(2)














































































































































Number of observations  6,208 6,208 3,086  3,086
R2    0.73  0.74  0.67 0.68
Source:  Gravity model, 2007.
Notes:  
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level.References 
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Source: Gravity model projections, 2007.






































Figure 3 —Infrastructural complementarities, 2001
Source: Gravity model projections, 2007.
Note: “50 percent” and “90 percent” indicate that all countries have a road density equal 
to the highest 50 and 90 percent of the sample, respectively.
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